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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Gene

district court's order revoking

Olson appeals from

probation and executing a reduced unified sentence of seven years, with one
year fixed, upon his guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. On appeal,
Olson argues the district court erred by failing to give him credit toward his
sentence for 250 days he spent incarcerated in Washington as a sanction for
violating the conditions of his community custody in that state.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
After Olson pied guilty to possessing methamphetamine, the district court
imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.60-71,
72-83, 86-97, 100-110; Tr., p.52, Ls.14-23.) The court suspended the sentence
and placed Olson on probation for four years. (Id.) Shortly after he was placed
on probation, Olson transferred his supervision to the State of Washington
through an Interstate Compact agreement.

(R., pp.113, 116, 196; Tr., p.62,

Ls.20-23.)
While residing in Washington, Olson did not do well on probation.

(R.,

pp.113-66; Tr., p.56, Ls.56, Ls.20-22.) On or about March 24, 2010, Washington
authorities arrested Olson for committing new felony crimes and for violating
numerous other conditions of his community custody.

(R., pp.116, 125-34.)

Following a hearing on April 9, 2010, the Washington Department Of Corrections
found Olson guilty of 11 separate community custody violations. (R., pp.141-43,
200.) As a sanction, the Washington hearing officer recommended that Olson

1

be "[r]eturn[ed] to sending state (Idaho) to serve [the] remainder of [his]
p.143;

also pp.141, 200.)

In the alternative,

hearing

officer ordered Olson to be confined for 250 days in the Okanogan County Jail.
(R., pp.141, 143, 200.) It appears from the record that Olson was confined in the

Okanogan County Jail on both the community custody violations and the new
felony charges until at least November 2010. (R., p.116, 197.)
On April 19, 2011, the Interstate Compact Program Coordinator for the
Idaho Department Of Correction (IDOC) filed a report of violation alleging that,
between April 2008 and March 2011, Olson had committed 14 separate
violations of the court ordered conditions of his probation. (R., pp.113-17.) A
Warrant Of Arrest For Probation Violation was issued on April 20, 2011 (R.,
pp.170-71) and was served on Olson in the State of Washington on or about
April 25, 2011 (R., pp.197, 202-03).

Olson waived extradition but was not

transported to Idaho until June 2012. (R., pp.197, 202-03.)
On June 25, 2012, IDOC officials filed a second report of probation
violation alleging that, on May 12, 2011, Olson had been convicted of two new
felonies in the State of Washington and, as a result, "was committed to 30
months incarceration." (R., pp.180-81.) Olson admitted the allegations in both
reports of violation. (Tr., p.36, L.21 - p.49, L.18.)
Before the disposition hearing, Olson filed a Motion To Determine Credit
For Time Served. (R., pp.196-99.) In the motion, Olson argued he was legally
entitled to credit for the time he spent in custody since being served with the
Idaho warrant on or about April 25, 2011. (R., pp.197-98.) "In the interests of
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justice," he also sought credit or, alternatively, a reduction of his sentence, for
the 250 days he served in Washington as a sanction for violating the conditions
of his community custody in that state. (R., p.198.) Specificaliy, Olson argued:
Mr. Olsen [sic] was in the State of Washington via interstate
compact. The Washington Department of Correction imposed 250
days of time on Mr. Olsen [sic] while he was pending disposition of
his new charges. He is entitled to credit for that time. The
attached documents show that Mr. Olsen [sic] was "sentenced" to
250 days if Idaho did not extradite him back immediately. Idaho did
not extradite him back until this year.

it is unclear what authority Washington had to impose any
time on Mr. Olsen [sic] but they did. In the interests of justice Mr.
Olsen [sic] should be credited for that time. In the alternative Mr.
Olsen [sic] requests that his sentence be modified to show a
reduction of those 250 days.
(R., p.198.)
At the disposition hearing on July 9, 2012, the district court took up the
issue of Olson's entitlement to credit for time served. (Tr., p.53, L. 1 - p.56, L.7.)
The court ultimately determined Olson was entitled to credit for a total of 575
days served, reflecting 100 days of prejudgment incarceration and 475 days of
incarceration following service of the Idaho warrant. (Tr., p.55, L.20 - p.56, L.1.)
Counsel for Olson agreed that 575 days "seems like the appropriate calculation"
(Tr., p.56, Ls.4-6) and requested that, in addition to being given credit for time
served, Olson's sentence also be reduced by at least the 250 days he served as
a sanction in Washington before he was served with the Idaho warrant (Tr., p.57,
L.20 - p.59, L.12). Specifically, counsel argued:
So what we're asking for, Your Honor, is that if the court
does chose [sic] to impose time, that he be given credit for time
served, as well as a reduction by at least that 250 days, that he be
given the opportunity to parole here and/or be placed on probation
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can get to Vvashington and complete

l

p.

59,

2

3-5 ("[W]e'd ask

a

reduction in his sentence to allow him out on a probation and to get back to
Washington to parole."), p.59, Ls.6-12 ("[W]e'd ask that his sentence be reduced
that 250 days at a minimum .... ").)
At the conclusion of the disposition hearing, the district court revoked
Olson's probation and imposed his underlying sentence. (Tr., p.63, L.17 - p.64,
L.4.) However, recognizing Olson had already spent a significant amount of time
in custody, the court reduced Olson's sentence from seven years, with two years
fixed, to seven years, with only one year fixed.

(Tr., p.63, L.21 - p.64, L.B.)

Consistent with its earlier calculation, the court also gave Olson credit for 575
days served, making Olson immediately parole eligible. (Tr., p.64, L.9.) Olson
timely appealed from the court's order revoking probation and executing the
reduced sentence. (R, pp.211-19, 228-31, 233-37.)
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ISSUE
the
the
err
it
Olson's
Credit for Time Served for the 250 days imposed by the State of
Washington and served in the Okanogan County Jail pursuant to a
decision in Washington to sanction Mr. Olson for violating the terms
of his community custody agreement?
(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
state rephrases the issues as:
Has Olson failed to show the district court erred by not giving him credit
for the jail time he served in Washington before being arrested on the Idaho
warrant?
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ARGUMENT
Olson Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Not Giving Him Credit
For The Jail Time He Served In Washington Before Being Arrested
On The Idaho Warrant
A.

Introduction
Before he was arrested on the Idaho \/Varrant Of Arrest For Probation

Violation, Olson served 250 days in the Okanogan County Jail as a sanction for
violating his community custody agreement in Washington state. (R., pp.141-43,
197, 200.) Olson argues on appeal that the district court erred by not giving him
credit toward his Idaho sentence for those 250 days. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-6.)
Olson's argument fails. At the disposition hearing, Olson agreed with the court's
calculation of credit for time served and asked the district court to reduce his
sentence to reflect the 250 days he served in Washington before being arrested
on the Idaho warrant, and the district court granted that request; Olson's
appellate claim of entitlement to credit for time served is therefore precluded by
the doctrine of invited error. Alternatively, correct application of the law shows
Olson has no legal entitlement to the credit he seeks.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit

for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is
subject to free review by the appellate courts." State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67,
68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763,
779 P.2d 438 (Ct App. 1989)). The construction and application of a statute
also presents a question of law over which the appellate court exercises free

6

p

State v. Robinson, 143
v. Schwartz, 1

C.

7 9,

360,

730

1

Olson Is Precluded By The Invited Error Doctrine From Claiming The
District Court Erred By Not Giving Him Credit For The 250 Days He
Served In Washington Before Being Arrested On The Idaho Warrant

··it has long been the law in Idaho that one may not successfully complain
of errors one has acquiesced in or invited. Errors consented to, acquiesced in,
or invited are not reversible." State v. Dunlap,_ P.3d _ , 2013 WL 4539806,
*27 (Idaho Aug. 27, 2013) (quoting State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836, 838, 673
P.2d 436, 438 (1983)) (internal citations omitted).

The purpose of the invited

error doctrine is to prevent a party who "caused or played an important role in
prompting a trial court" to take a particular action from "later challenging that
decision on appeal." State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120
(1999). This doctrine applies to sentencing decisions as well as to rulings during
trial. State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho 462, 465, 788 P .2d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 1990).
After Olson admitted to having violated the conditions of his probation, he
filed a Motion To Determine Credit For Time Served in which he asked the
district court, "in the interests of justice," to give him credit toward his sentence
for the 250 days he served in Washington as a sanction for violating his
community custody agreement or, alternatively, to modify his sentence "to show
a reduction of those 250 days." (R., pp.197-98.) At the July 9, 2012 disposition
hearing, Olson's attorney agreed with the court's determination that Olson was
entitled to credit for 575 days served, reflecting 100 days of prejudgment
incarceration and 475 days of incarceration following service of the Idaho bench
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warrant (Tr., p.55, L.9
credit

p.56, L.6.) Then,

than asking the court to give

in VVashington before being

250 days

on

the Idaho warrant, Olson's attorney specifically asked the court to reduce Olson's
sentence "by at least [those] 250 days" so that he would be immediately parole
eligible. (Tr., p.57, L.20 - p.58, L 12; see also Tr., p.59, Ls.3-12.) The district
court effectively granted that request and reduced the fixed portion of Olson's
sentence by one year.

(Tr., p.63, L.21 - p.64, L.9.)

Having agreed with the

court's calculation of credit for time served, and having specifically invited the
court to reduce his sentence to reflect the 250 days he served in Washington not to give him additional credit toward his sentence therefor - Olson cannot
successfully complain on appeal that the district court erred by granting his
request for a reduction of sentence rather than giving him credit toward his
sentence for those 250 days. Olson's appellate claim is barred by the doctrine of
invited error. 1

It is apparent from the court's comments at the disposition hearing that it
reduced Olson's sentence in recognition of Olson's request that his sentence be
modified to reflect the time he spent in custody during his probationary period. If
this Court determines Olson's appellate argument is not precluded by the invited
doctrine and that Olson is entitled to credit toward his sentence for the 250 days
he served in Washington between March and November 2010, the state
respectfully submits the appropriate remedy would be to remand this case for
resentencing; otherwise, Olson would get a windfall in the form of credit for time
served and the reduction of his sentence that was intended by the district court
to compensate Olson for the time he spent in custody before being finally
adjudicated in violation of his probation.
1
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D

Alternatively, Olson Has Failed To Show Any Statutory Entitlement To
Credit For The 250 Days He Served In Washington Before Being Arrested
On The Idaho Bench Warrant
intent" is

to

words

interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words.
Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009).

State v. Doe, 1

Where the statutory language is

unambiguous, a court does not construe it but simply follows the law as written.
McLean v. Maverick County Stores. Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759
(2006).

Thus, if the plain language of a statute is capable of only one

reasonable interpretation, it is the court's duty to give the statute that
interpretation. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889,
894-896, 265 P.3d 502, 507-509 (2011) (disavowing cases with language that
Court might not give effect to unambiguous language of statute if such was
"palpably absurd").
Idaho Code § 19-2603 governs a defendant's entitlement to credit for time
served upon execution of the defendant's sentence following a probation
violation. Specifically the statute provides:

Pronouncement and execution of judgment after
violation of probation. - When the defendant is brought before
the court in such case, it may, if judgment has been withheld,
pronounce any judgment which it could originally have pronounced,
or, if judgment was originally pronounced but suspended, the
original judgment shall be in full force and effect and may be
executed according to law, and the time such person shall have
been at large under such suspended sentence shall not be counted
as a part of the term of his sentence, but the time of the
defendant's sentence shall count from the date of service of such
bench warrant.
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I.C. § 19-2603 (bolded emphasis original, italicized
the plain language of this statute, a

added). Pursuant

whose probation is revoked as

a result of a probation violation is only entitled to credit toward his sentence
the time he served from the date of service of the bench warrant on the
violation(s). Id.; accord State v. Buys, 129 Idaho 122, 127, 922 P.2d 419, 424
(Ct. App. 1996) ("Section 19-2603 provides that if a probationer has been
arrested and probation revoked as a result of a violation, the defendant's
incarceration from the time of service of the bench warrant will count as part of
the sentence." (footnote omitted)); State v. Lively, 131 Idaho 279, 280, 954 P.2d
1075, 1076 (Ct. App. 1998) (same).

The language of the statute makes no

provision for entitlement to credit for time served in custody as a condition of
probation.

I.C. § 19-2603; see also State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 43 P.3d 765

(2002) (defendant not entitled to credit for time served as a condition of
probation); State v. Banks, 121 Idaho 608, 826 P.2d 1320 (1992) (same).
In this case, it is undisputed that, while in Washington pursuant to an
Interstate Compact, Olson violated the conditions of his community custody
agreement in that state and was sanctioned with 250 days incarceration in the
Okanogan County Jail, beginning on March 24, 2010.

(R., pp.141-43, 200.)

However, Idaho did not institute probation revocation proceedings against Olson
until April 2011 (R., p.113), and the actual Warrant Of Arrest For Probation
Violation was served on Olson on or about April 25, 2011 (R., pp.197, 202-03;
Tr., p.54, L.8 - p.55, L.19). Applying the plain language of I.C. § 19-2603 that
only allows credit for time served from the date of service of the bench warrant
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for a probation violation, Olson was only entitled to credit for the time he served
from the April 25, 2011 service of the bench warrant; he was not entitled to credit
toward his sentence for the 250 days he served in Washington before being
served with the Idaho warrant.
Olson argues otherwise.

Specifically, he contends that, by sanctioning

him with 250 days jail time for violating the conditions of his community custody
agreement in Washington state, Washington was holding him "on the functional
equivalent to a bench warrant," such that he was entitled under LC. § 19-2603 to
credit toward his sentence for that time spent in custody. (Appellant's brief, pp.46.) To support his position, Olson relies on Buys, supra. Olson correctly notes
that, in Buys, the Court of Appeals held Buys was entitled to credit for time
served pursuant to an "order of incarceration" - entered by the district court
before the issuance of any bench warrant on Buys' alleged probation violations based on its determination that the "order of incarceration" "appear[ed] to be the
functional equivalent of a bench warrant issued as a consequence of an alleged
violation of probation terms." Buys, 129 Idaho at 127-28, 922 P.2d at 424-25.
Olson's reliance on the rationale of Buys to establish his entitlement to credit for
the 250 days he served in Washington before being served with the Idaho
Warrant Of Arrest For Probation Violation is unavailing for at least two reasons.
First, the rationale of Buys - that a defendant is entitled to credit for time
served on orders that are the "functional equivalent" of a bench warrant - is
inconsistent with the unambiguous language of I.C. § 19-2603 that only permits
credit for time served from the date of service of the actual bench warrant.
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Where, as here, the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court
must apply statute as written. Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96, 265 P.3d at 508-09
(disavowing cases with language that Court might not give effect to unambiguous
language of statute if such was "palpably absurd").

To the extent Buys holds

otherwise, it was wrongly decided in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's later
opinion in Verska and should therefore be overruled. State v. Dana, 137 Idaho
6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002) (controlling precedent must be followed "unless it
is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or
unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and
remedy continued injustice").
Second, the facts of Buys are distinguishable from the facts of this case.
The defendant in Buys was arrested in Idaho for violating the conditions of his
Idaho probation.

In this case, Olson was arrested in Washington state for

violating the conditions of his community custody agreement in that state. The
state recognizes Olson was being supervised in Washington pursuant to an
Interstate Compact, but the state is unaware of any authority, and Olson has
identified none, that would permit Washington to effectively execute a portion of
Olson's Idaho sentence. Nor does it appear from the record that that was the
Washington hearing officer's intent. (See R., pp.141-43, 200 (sanctioning with
local jail time in lieu of returning to sending state)).
Because the plain language of I.C. § 19-2603 only allows credit for time
served from the date of service of the bench warrant for a probation violation,
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Olson is not entitled under the statute to credit toward his sentence for the 250
days he served in Washington before being arrested on the Idaho Warrant.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order that revoked Olson's probation, executed a reduced sentence and gave
Olson credit for 575 days served.
DATED this 11 th day of December 2013.
.,,,.-----,
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